Searches for Axion-Like Particles with NGC1275: Current and Future Bounds

Galaxy clusters contain large magnetic fields that make them excellent targets to search for ultralight Axion-Like Particles (ALPs). ALP-photon interconversion imprints quasi-sinusoidal oscillations on the X-ray spectra of point sources in or behind the cluster. The absence of substantial oscillations allows us to place bounds on $g_{a \gamma \gamma}$. Here the bounds from the {\it Chandra} X-ray observations of NGC1275 are presented, as well as those predicted for the {\it Athena} X-ray observatory, due to launch in 2028.Comment: Contributed to the 13th Patras Workshop on Axions, WIMPs and WISPs, Thessaloniki, May 15 to 19, 201

A hybrid algorithm for coalition structure generation

The current state-of-the-art algorithm for optimal coalition structure generation is IDP-IP—an algorithm that combines IDP (a dynamic programming algorithm due to Rahwan and Jennings, 2008b) with IP (a tree-search algorithm due to Rahwan et al., 2009). In this paper we analyse IDP-IP, highlight its limitations, and then develop a new approach for combining IDP with IP that overcomes these limitations

Coalition structure generation over graphs

We give the analysis of the computational complexity of coalition structure generation over graphs. Given an undirected graph G = (N,E) and a valuation function v : P(N) → R over the subsets of nodes, the problem is to find a partition of N into connected subsets, that maximises the sum of the components values. This problem is generally NP-complete; in particular, it is hard for a defined class of valuation functions which are independent of disconnected members — that is, two nodes have no effect on each others marginal contribution to their vertex separator. Nonetheless, for all such functions we provide bounds on the complexity of coalition structure generation over general and minor free graphs. Our proof is constructive and yields algorithms for solving corresponding instances of the problem. Furthermore, we derive linear time bounds for graphs of bounded treewidth. However, as we show, the problem remains NP-complete for planar graphs, and hence, for any Kk minor free graphs where k ≥ 5. Moreover, a 3-SAT problem with m clauses can be represented by a coalition structure generation problem over a planar graph with O(m2) nodes. Importantly, our hardness result holds for a particular subclass of valuation functions, termed edge sum, where the value of each subset of nodes is simply determined by the sum of given weights of the edges in the induced subgraph

Improving location prediction services for new users with probabilistic latent semantic analysis

Location prediction systems that attempt to determine the mobility patterns of individuals in their daily lives have become increasingly common in recent years. Approaches to this prediction task include eigenvalue decomposition [5], non-linear time series analysis of arrival times [10], and variable order Markov models [1]. However, these approachesall assume sufficient sets of training data. For new users, by definition, this data is typically not available, leading to poor predictive performance. Given that mobility is a highly personal behaviour, this represents a significant barrier to entry. Against this background, we present a novel framework to enhance prediction using information about the mobility habits of existing users. At the core of the framework is a hierarchical Bayesian model, a type of probabilistic semantic analysis [7], representing the intuition that the temporal features of the new user’s location habits are likely to be similar to those of an existing user in the system. We evaluate this framework on the real life location habits of 38 users in the Nokia Lausanne dataset, showing that accuracy is improved by 16%, relative to the state of the art, when predicting the next location of new users

Mechanism design for eliciting probabilistic estimates from multiple suppliers with unknown costs and limited precision

This paper reports on the design of a novel two-stage mechanism, based on strictly proper scoring rules, that allows a centre to acquire a costly probabilistic estimate of some unknown parameter, by eliciting and fusing estimates from multiple suppliers. Each of these suppliers is capable of producing a probabilistic estimate of any precision, up to a privately known maximum, and by fusing several low precision estimates together the centre is able to obtain a single estimate with a specified minimum precision. Specifically, in the mechanism's first stage M from N agents are pre-selected by eliciting their privately known costs. In the second stage, these M agents are sequentially approached in a random order and their private maximum precision is elicited. A payment rule, based on a strictly proper scoring rule, then incentivises them to make and truthfully report an estimate of this maximum precision, which the centre fuses with others until it achieves its specified precision. We formally prove that the mechanism is incentive compatible regarding the costs, maximum precisions and estimates, and that it is individually rational. We present empirical results showing that our mechanism describes a family of possible ways to perform the pre-selection in the first stage, and formally prove that there is one that dominates all others

Mechanism design for eliciting probabilistic estimates from multiple suppliers with unknown costs and limited precision

This paper reports on the design of a novel two-stage mechanism, based on strictly proper scoring rules, that allows a centre to acquire a costly probabilistic estimate of some unknown parameter, by eliciting and fusing estimates from multiple suppliers. Each of these suppliers is capable of producing a probabilistic estimate of any precision, up to a privately known maximum, and by fusing several low precision estimates together the centre is able to obtain a single estimate with a specified minimum precision. Specifically, in the mechanism's first stage M from N agents are pre-selected by eliciting their privately known costs. In the second stage, these M agents are sequentially approached in a random order and their private maximum precision is elicited. A payment rule, based on a strictly proper scoring rule, then incentivises them to make and truthfully report an estimate of this maximum precision, which the centre fuses with others until it achieves its specified precision. We formally prove that the mechanism is incentive compatible regarding the costs, maximum precisions and estimates, and that it is individually rational. We present empirical results showing that our mechanism describes a family of possible ways to perform the pre-selection in the first stage, and formally prove that there is one that dominates all others